State or market? How to effectively decrease alcohol-related crash fatalities and injuries by Nazif-Muñoz, Jose I. et al.
University of Massachusetts Amherst 
ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst 
Biostatistics and Epidemiology Faculty 
Publications Series Biostatistics and Epidemiology 
2020 
State or market? How to effectively decrease alcohol-related 
crash fatalities and injuries 
Jose I. Nazif-Muñoz 




University of Massachusetts Amherst 
Arijit Nandi 
McGill University 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umass.edu/bioepi_faculty_pubs 
 Part of the Biostatistics Commons, and the Health Policy Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Nazif-Muñoz, Jose I.; Batomen, Brice; Oulhote, Youssef; and Nandi, Arijit, "State or market? How to 
effectively decrease alcohol-related crash fatalities and injuries" (2020). Biostatistics and Epidemiology 
Faculty Publications Series. 
74(6), http://dx.doi.org/10.1136/jech-2019-213191 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Biostatistics and Epidemiology at 
ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. It has been accepted for inclusion in Biostatistics and Epidemiology Faculty 
Publications Series by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. For more information, 
please contact scholarworks@library.umass.edu. 
► Additional material is
published online only. To view
















Received 5 September 2019
Revised 18 February 2020
Accepted 22 February 2020
© Author(s) (or their
employer(s)) 2020. Re-use
permitted under CC BY-NC.
No commercial re-use. See
rights and permissions.
Published by BMJ.
To cite: Nazif-Muñoz JI,
Batomen B, Oulhote Y, et al.
J Epidemiol Community
Health 2020;74:502–509.
State or market? How to effectively decrease
alcohol-related crash fatalities and injuries
Jose I Nazif-Muñoz,1,2 Brice Batomen,3 Youssef Oulhote,4 Jack Spengler,2 Arijit Nandi3
ABSTRACT
Background It is estimated that more than 270 000
people die yearly in alcohol-related crashes globally. To
tackle this burden, government interventions, such as
laws which restrict blood alcohol concentration
(BAC) levels and increase penalties for drunk drivers, have
been implemented. The introduction of private-sector
measures, such as ridesharing, is regarded as alternatives
to reduce drunk driving and related sequelae. However, it
is unclear whether state and private efforts complement
each other to reduce this public health challenge.
Methods We conducted interrupted time-series
analyses using weekly alcohol-related traffic fatalities and
injuries per 1 000 000 population in three urban
conglomerates (Santiago, Valparaíso and Concepción) in
Chile for the period 2010–2017. We selected cities in
which two state interventions—the ‘zero tolerance law’
(ZTL), which decreased BAC, and the ‘Emilia law’ (EL),
which increased penalties for drunk drivers—were
implemented to decrease alcohol-related crashes, and
where Uber ridesharing was launched.
Results In Santiago, the ZTL was associated with a 29.1%
decrease (95%CI 1.2 to 70.2), the ELwith a 41.0%decrease
(95% CI 5.5 to 93.2) and Uber with a non-significant 28.0%
decrease (95% CI −6.4 to 78.5) in the level of weekly
alcohol-related traffic fatalities and injuries per 1 000 000
population series. In Concepción, the EL was associated with
a 28.9% reduction (95% CI 4.3 to 62.7) in the level of the
same outcome. In Valparaíso, the ZTL had a −0.01 decrease
(95% CI −0.02 to −0.00) in the trend of weekly alcohol-
related crashes per 1 000 000 population series.
Conclusion In Chile, concomitant decreases of alcohol-
related crashes were observed after two state
interventions were implemented but not with the
introduction of Uber. Relationships between public policy
interventions, ridesharing and motor vehicle alcohol-
related crashes differ between cities and over time, which
might reflect differences in specific local characteristics.
INTRODUCTION
Drunk driving is a major cause of global mortality. It is
estimated that more than 270 000 people die yearly in
alcohol-related crashes across the world.1 To tackle
this burden, many government interventions have
been introduced, including laws which restrict blood
alcohol concentration (BAC) levels in drivers,2 limit
alcohol availability,3 4 reduce the density of outlets,5
establishminimum legal age to drink,6 increase alcohol
taxes,7 and promote checkpoints.8 These measures
aim to reduce alcohol-impaired driving by decreasing
either alcohol consumption or the probability of driv-
ing after already being impaired by alcohol.
While state interventions can be effective in redu-
cing alcohol-related traffic fatalities and injuries.2–8
private initiatives have also been promoted to
respond to this public health challenge. Designated
driver programmes and smartphone-enabled net-
work ridesharing have both been regarded as alter-
natives to complement state efforts. In the former,
one individual agrees before a given social group to
abstain from drinking alcohol in order to drive, so
members of the group can be safely transported. In
the latter, ridesharing networks provide alternatives
to drinking and driving since individuals may opt for
these private services when access to public trans-
portation may be limited and/or traditional taxis
costs may be higher. Yet, the literature on both
initiatives is sparse. A systematic review suggested
that designated driver programmes were not found
to be effective in decreasing alcohol-related traffic
outcomes.9 Research has also assessed the effects of
network ridesharing on accidents,10–16 with six
studies10–15 looking at the association between net-
work ridesharing and alcohol-impaired driving in
the United States (US). Results are mixed, with
Martin-Buck,12 Greenwood and Wattal,13 Peck14
andMorrison et al15 showing reductions in alcohol-
related crashes after Uber was introduced, whereas
Brazil and Kirk10 and Dills and Mulholland11 did
not observe any change in these outcomes.
In this study, we contribute to the body of
research interested in assessing whether public and
private initiatives influence alcohol-related crash
fatalities and injuries. More specifically, we con-
ducted a time-series analysis in Chile between
2010 and 2017 to empirically assess the association
of (a) the zero tolerance law (ZTL), which deter-
mined the maximum legal BAC for fully licensed
drivers to be 80 mg of alcohol in 100 mL of blood,
(b) the Emilia law (EL), which established that dri-
vers who were intoxicated and responsible for ser-
ious injuries and/or fatalities must serve at least
1 year in prison and (c) the introduction of rideshar-
ing on alcohol-related crash fatalities and injuries.
This work has the potential to advance research
concerning the impact of population-level interven-
tions on alcohol-related crash fatalities and injuries.
First, to the best of our knowledge, all studies explor-
ing the association between ridesharing and alcohol-
related incidents have been carried out in the US;
however, results from these studies may not be gen-
eralizable to other settings with different epidemio-
logic profiles, mobility patterns and transport
infrastructure. For instance, there were 1.3 road
fatalities per 100 000 registered vehicles in the US
in 2016, whereas the corresponding rate was 3.8 per
100 000 in Chile.17 Further, the number of registered
vehicles per 1000 population in the US is 891 com-
pared to 277 in Chile.17 Second, studies exploring




















ridesharing have not considered variation in drink and drive laws
either across or within states, and therefore the associations of
ridesharing may be biased due to unmeasured confounding by
omitted co-interventions. Last, from a methodological point of
view, the rich cross-urban conglomerate time-series data available
for Chile allow us to control for the impact of confounding factors
which change relatively slowly over time, such as age distribution,
and for time-varying confounders such as seasonality with the help
of Autoregressive Integrated Moving Average (ARIMA) models.18
Hence, Chilean data permit us to expand our road safety knowl-
edge of Chile and the South American region more generally and
contribute to our understanding of whether state efforts to curb
drinking and driving and private ridesharing initiatives influence
alcohol-related morbidity and mortality.
STUDY CONTEXT
InChile from2010 to 2017, approximately 14%of allmotor vehicle
fatalities and 12% of all motor vehicle serious injuries were
alcohol involved.19 To reduce the prevalence of alcohol-related
crash fatalities and injuries, two different governments, with dissim-
ilar political tendencies, enacted two laws: the ZTL and the EL. The
first one was passed on 15 March 2012 and introduced two impor-
tant changes regarding BAC levels. First, it lowered the maximum
legal BAC for fully licensed drivers from 100 mg of alcohol in
100 mL of blood (1.0%) to 80 mg (0.8%). With this law, any
motor vehicle driver with BACs higher than 0.8% is subject to
penal sanctions established by Chile’s criminal code.20 Second, it
established a newdefinition of driving under the influence of alcohol,
since it decreased the legally accepted BAC from 0.5% to 0.3%. Any
driver with BACs higher than 0.3% and lower than 0.8% became
subject to administrative sanctions established by Chile’s traffic code.
The second law was decreed on 16 September 2014.21 It introduced
higher penalties for drivers responsible for alcohol-related crashes in
which there were fatal or seriously injured victims.More specifically,
it determined that these drivers would be imprisoned at least 1 year
without the possibility of parole. It also established that hit-and-run
and rejecting a breathalyser test were criminal offences, and these
drivers would face both administrative and criminal sanctions. It is
noteworthy, however, that between 2010 and 2017 Chile did not
change any other law which could affect these outcomes. For
instance, there were no changes to the minimum legal age to drink,
restriction on advertising, promotion or sponsorship by producers of
alcohol, minimum prices or sales restrictions related to prices of
alcohol products, or taxes on alcohol-related products.22
In Chile prior to 2014, taxi transport services were exclusively
provided by private companies registered in the Ministry of
Transports and Telecommunications. During 2014, this service
offered more than 265 million trips in Chile’s capital city
Santiago, and the number of taxis offering this service in
Santiago, Valparaíso-Viña del Mar and Concepción was approxi-
mately 37 000.23 In January 2014, Uber launched its application
in Santiago, extending taxi transport services to its grounded
traveller population.24 On 11 April 2016, this application was
extended to the urban conglomerate of Valparaíso region,25 on
23 June 2016, to the urban conglomerate of Biobio region,26 and
last in January 2017 to seven other cities (Antofagasta, Copiapó,
Osorno, Puerto Montt, Rancagua, Temuco and Valdivia).27 By
2017, more than 2.3 million individuals had uploaded the Uber
application (this corresponds to 12% of Chile’s population),28
and the company had registered 80 000 drivers.29 More than
100 million trips were registered during 2017.30 It is important
to point out that while Uber is a service that typically requires
a credit card for payment, in Chile both credit card and cash are
available means to pay for services. Moreover, in Chile, the
number of credit cards per capita in the adult population
increased from 0.35 in 2010 to 1.02 in 2017.31 The number of
mobile phone contracts per capita in the adult population
increased from 0.36 to 0.78 over the same period.32 (Please
refer to online supplementary Appendix A to see trends in the
number of credit cards per capita and the number of mobile
phone contracts per capita.)
METHODS
Study design
We evaluated the impact of these three interventions in Chile
using an interrupted time–series design.33 We focused our ana-
lyses on urban conglomerates, which were exposed to the three
interventions of interest and had high values in the index of
connectivity and mobility (≥39) (this index considers various
dimensions such as health, housing, sociocultural conditions
and connectivity).34 Urban conglomerates eligible for inclusion
in this studywere: (a) had populations greater than 1 000 000; (b)
had municipalities with an index value of connectivity and mobi-
lity higher than 39 and (c) had Uber operations introduced
between 1 January 2014 and 31 December 2016. We imposed
these criteria in order to identify territories with sufficient popu-
lations, crashes and periods of analysis to detect changes in out-
comes after the introduction of Uber.
After applying our eligibility criteria, our analyses included
three urban conglomerates: (a) Santiago, with 35 municipalities
(population 6 266 191)35, (b) Concepción, with eight municipa-
lities (population 1 046 970)35 and (c) Valparaíso-Viña del Mar,
with seven municipalities (population 1 199 886)(please refer to
online supplementary Appendix B to see every municipality
included in the study).35 Our analytic sample included all alco-
hol-related crash fatalities and injuries between 1 January 2010
and 31 December 2017.
Data
We obtained data from the National Commission of Road
Safety’s Road Traffic Crashes Database. This organisation has
used Chile’s police force (Carabineros de Chile) reports to com-
pile an extensive database of traffic fatalities, injuries and crashes
in Chile from 1972 to the present. Fatalities are classified accord-
ing to road user type (driver, passenger, motorcyclist, bicyclist
and pedestrian), age, gender, time and day of the crash and
whether the victims had been drinking alcohol. This database
includes information, from all collisions involving injuries,
about the characteristics of the collision, the vehicle and the
individuals involved, including alcohol consumption.
Dependent variable
The dependent variable was the number of motor vehicle drivers
and passengers who died or were injured in any alcohol-related
traffic collision. We opted for this outcome, instead of the total
number of crashes, since each of the interventions was expected
to modify the decision of driving after having drunk alcohol.
Variables common to the data set and relevant to our analyses
were (a) crash date and time, (b) city and municipality in which
the crash occurred and (c) police assessment of alcohol involve-
ment (dichotomous). Using the municipality identification code,
we produced a binary indicator identifying all alcohol-related
crashes that occurred within the boundaries of the selected muni-
cipalities per urban conglomerate. We calculated rates per
1 000 000 population. The population denominator was chosen




















over the total number of crashes because the three interventions
were likely to affect the latter as well, potentially biasing the
results. In sensitivity analyses, however, we analysed each urban
conglomerate with the total number of crashes as both denomi-
nator and outcome. Results were qualitatively similar with crash
as denominator, and overall no effects were found when used as
outcome (see results in online supplementary Appendix C). We
also did an analysis stratifying by sex and results were robust
(results available upon request).
For this study, a weekly time series is the most appropriate since it
better captures the distribution of alcohol-related crashes. Further,
following Morrison et al (2018),15 we also tabulated all alcohol-
involved crash fatalities and injuries from 12:00 AM Wednesday to
11:59 PM Tuesday. In this way, crashes occurring on weekends may
not be randomly separated into different weeks. Furthermore, week-
end nights are peak periods for alcohol-involved crashes in Chile.19
Interventions
The main interruptions of interest were when the two laws were
introduced and the dates that Uber operations were launched. To
identify the dates indicating when Uber was launched in the
selected urban conglomerates, we studied online papers and
Uber press conferences carried out in Chile. A summary of the
interventions for the three urban conglomerates is presented in
table 1. For the weeks in which these changes occurred, we speci-
fied dichotomous independent variables in step (level) form (0 for
weeks before the change and 1 in the week of the change and for
subsequent weeks). This variable allows us to estimate level
changes in the series. We also considered trend (slope) changes
of each intervention. For this, we count the number of weeks after
each intervention at time t, coded 0 before the intervention and
increasing successively starting at 1 week after the introduction of
each intervention to the number of time points t (418). Trend
changes allow us to assess whether the interventions were short
term (immediate but not sustained), and long term (ie, immediate
and sustained, delayed and sustained and delayed with diminish-
ing or increasing gains over time).
Statistical analysis
To explore the relation between these three interventions and all
alcohol-related crash injuries and fatalities, we carried out inter-
rupted time-series analyses36 using the PROC ARIMA
(Autoregressive Integrated Moving Average) procedure in SAS
9.4.37 (We also repeated the analyses using Stata software and the
results are presented in online supplementary Appendix D.) This
statistical approach needs at least 50 temporal units and assumes
that the dependent variable is approximately normally
distributed36 and that the time series should be stationary (ie,
with constant mean and variance).
To detect whether each series was stationary, we assessed the
presence of unit roots using the Dickey-Fuller test and fitting
higher-order AR models. Once we identified the series to be
stationary, we proceeded to select which AR or ARMA model
best fit each series. For this, we assessed both the autocorrelation
and partial autocorrelation functions of each model and applied
the Ljung-Box test to model residuals at lags, 24 and 48. With
these numbers of lags, we were better equipped to detect the
presence of white noise throughout the weekly series.
To investigate the association of each intervention on alco-
hol-related crash injuries and fatalities, we applied three mod-
els: (1) the ‘Naïve model’ (Equation 1), (2) the ‘Uber-oriented
model’ (Equation 2) and (3) the ‘Full model’ (Equation 3).
The specification of each equation can be found in online
supplementary Appendix E. The ‘Naïve model’ only considers
whether each intervention had an effect on the level of the
series. We call this model ‘Naïve’ since we assumed interven-
tions do not vary in their intensity over time. However,
theoretically and empirically this can be inadequate since
effects of interventions can be short or long term,18 and for
the case of Chile, road safety policies have been found to be
short term.38 As such, the two other models assessed whether
the two laws had either short-term or long-term associations,
or both, on the series. The difference between the ‘Uber-
oriented model’ and the ‘Full model’ is that the former only
allows Uber’s introduction to affect the level of the series,
whereas the latter assesses whether the introduction of Uber
changed the trend.
RESULTS
Alcohol-related crash fatalities and injuries in Santiago
Three main results are presented in table 2. First, the three
models show that the ZTL was associated with a level change in
the series. The most conservative result is depicted in the ‘Full
model’, which indicated that the law was associated with a−0.34
reduction (95% CI −0.67 to −0.02) in the level of alcohol-
related traffic fatalities and injury rates per 1 000 000 population.
This corresponds to a 29.1% decrease (95% CI 1.2 to 70.2).
Second, the EL (‘Full model’) was associated with a −0.48
decrease (95% CI −0.89 to −0.07) in the level of alcohol-
related traffic fatalities and injuries per population. This corre-
sponds to 41.0% decrease (95% CI 5.5 to 93.2). A slight change
of −0.02 (95% CI −0.04 to −0.00) in the weekly trend follow-
ing its introduction was also observed. Last, in the ‘Full model’,
Uber was not observed to have an effect on the outcome of
interest. We estimated a −0.33 decrease (95% CI −0.74 to
0.09) in the level of alcohol-related crash fatalities and injury
rate per 1 000 000 population. This corresponds to a non-
significant 28.0% decrease (95% CI −6.4 to 78.5). There was
also an increase in the weekly trend in fatalities and injury rate by
0.02 (95% CI 0.00 to 0.04) per week. Ljung-Box tests and AIC
values for each model and city are presented in online supplemen
tary Appendix F.
Interventions on alcohol-related crash fatalities and injuries in
Concepción
In table 3, we provide the results corresponding to Concepción.
Regardless of the model, the ZTL was not associated with alco-
hol-related crash fatalities and injuries. The EL, on the other
hand, was associated with a short-term reduction in both the
‘Uber-oriented model’ and the ‘Full model’. In the ‘Full model’,
we estimated a −1.02 decrease (95% CI −1.87 to −0.18) in the
level of the main outcome after the EL was introduced. This is
equivalent to a 28.9% reduction (95% CI 4.3 to 62.7). We
estimated a 0.02 increase (95% CI 0.01 to 0.04) in the trend of
the rate of alcohol-related crash fatalities and injuries. Last, Uber
Table 1 Interventions in three urban conglomerates, Chile, 2014–2016
Urban
conglomerate Zero tolerance law Emilia law Uber launch
Santiago 1 January 2014
























was not associated with the rate of alcohol-related traffic fatal-
ities in any of the models.
Interventions on alcohol-related crash fatalities and injuries in
Valparaiso-Viña del Mar
We highlight three main results from table 4. First, the ZTL had
a delayed and slight sustained effect, with the ‘ZTL change in trend’
parameter indicating a−0.01 reduction (95% CI−0.02 to−0.00) in
the weekly rate of alcohol-related crash fatalities and injuries per
1 000 000 population. Second, the EL was not associated with the
outcome in any model. Last, there was no evidence for an impact of
Uber in the last twomodels, althoughweobserveda0.49 increase (95%
CI−0.03 to 1.00) in the level of the outcome in the ‘Naïve model’.
Figures 1–4 present the observed values for alcohol-related crash
fatalities and injuries and their predicted values per urban conglom-
erate. Changes in predicted values due to the interventions are
clearly visible in Santiago (figure 1 and figure 2), which shows
that rates of alcohol-related crash fatalities and injuries dropped
substantially after both laws for the best twomodels. In Concepción
(figure 3), we observed a short-term reduction in the level of fatal-
ities and injuries after the EL, followed by an increasing trend that
was mitigated by the introduction of Uber. Last, in Valparaíso-Viña
del Mar (figure 4), we observed a delayed beneficial effect of the
ZTL and the subsequent increase in the EL trend.
DISCUSSION
In Chile, state interventions seem to prevent alcohol-related colli-
sions more successfully than the introduction of Uber. This time-
series analysis, conducted in three urban conglomerates where two
state interventions were introduced, demonstrates that in highly
populated locations these efforts can be effective. However, their
sustainability may be a function of geographical location charac-
teristics. We also examine whether ridesharing had spillover
effects in this context; nevertheless, we did not consistently
observe positive externalities on our primary outcome.
We explored whether a combination of public and private
efforts would reduce the incidence of alcohol-related crash fatal-
ities and injuries since reducing BAC levels (ZTL), introducing
higher penalties for individuals driving under the influence of
alcohol (EL) and the lower perceived financial and expediency
costs associated with ridesharing (Uber) would have decreased
the likelihood that someone would have driven after already
being impaired by alcohol. As such, we assessed whether each
intervention could have either a short term, abrupt and perma-
nent, delayed and sustained or delayed with diminishing or
increasing gains over time. Findings suggest that legislative
reforms were more effective than the introduction of ridesharing
in the three urban areas evaluated. However, these state efforts
are not homogenous across the urban conglomerates analysed. In
Santiago, both laws were effective in reducing alcohol-related
crash fatalities and injuries. In Concepción, only the EL shows
a sharp short-term association. Last, in Valparaíso-Viña del Mar,
we observed a delayed and mild association of the ZTL.
Surprisingly, the introduction of Uber in Chile did not seem to
influence trends.
The observed variability in the estimated relationships across
cities and interventions may be due to differing circumstances
Table 2 Associations of three interventions on alcohol-related motor vehicle crashes rates per 10 000 000 population, Concepción, 1 January 2010
—31 December 2017 (SARIMA (2,0,0) (1,0,0)8) for residuals
Naïve model Uber-oriented model Full model
β 95% CI P-value β 95% CI P-value β 95% CI P-value
Time 0.003 0.001 to 0.004 0.006 0.001 −0.002 to 0.005 0.458 0.001 −0.002 to 0.005 0.415
Zero tolerance law −0.451 −0.690 to −0.229 0.002 −0.404 −0.733 to −0.075 0.015 −0.341 −0.665 to −0.017 0.036
Zero tolerance law change in trend 0.002 −0.003 to 0.008 0.433 0.001 −0.005 to 0.006 0.846
Emilia law −0.098 −0.369 to 0.173 0.476 −0.141 −0.4265 to 0.144 0.331 −0.481 −0.885 to −0.077 0.020
Emilia law change in trend −0.000 −0.005 to 0.004 0.844 −0.019 −0.035 to −0.002 0.027
Uber −0.028 −0.285 to 0.229 0.830 −0.080 −0.444 to 0.285 0.668 −0.329 −0.746 to 0.089 0.122
Uber trend 0.020 0.002 to 0.037 0.025
Constant 1.090 0.948 to 1.239 <0.001 1.175 0.943 to 1.407 <0.001 1.172 0.950 to 1.395 <0.001
Autoregressive, Akaike information criterion and Ljung-Box tests values for each model are available in online supplementary Appendix F.
Table 3 Associations of three interventions on alcohol-related motor vehicle crash rates per 10 000 000 population, Concepción, 1 January 2010—
31 December 2017 (ARMA (2,0)) for residuals
Naïve model Uber-oriented model Full model
β 95% CI P-value β 95% CI P-value β 95% CI P-value
Time 0.003 −0.002 to 0.008 0.269 −0.006 −0.014 to 0.003 0.195 −0.006 −0.014 to 0.003 0.189
Zero tolerance law −0.676 −1.424 to 0.072 0.077 −0.108 −0.907 to 0.690 0.790 −0.109 −0.896 to 0.677 0.785
Zero tolerance law change in trend 0.008 −0.004 to 0.019 0.185 0.008 −0.003 to 0.019 0.178
Emilia law −0.195 −0.908 to 0.518 0.591 −0.694 −1.468 to 0.081 0.079 −1.024 −1.867 to −0.181 0.017
Emilia law change in trend 0.014 0.002 to 0.026 0.026 0.021 0.007 to 0.035 0.004
Uber 0.463 −0.195 to 1.121 0.168 −0.627 −1.589 to 0.335 0.201 −0.545 −1.498 to 0.405 0.259
Uber trend −0.018 −0.037 to 0.001 0.070
Constant 3.051 2.630 to 3.472 <0.001 3.551 2.966 to 4.135 <0.001 3.549 2.974 to 4.124 <0.001
Autoregressive, Akaike information criterion and Ljung-Box test values for each model are available in online supplementary Appendix F.




















in which the laws were enforced, different levels of alcohol
consumption in each analysed city, and how ridesharing opera-
tions may have changed over time. First, with respect to
enforcement, one study38 suggested that police controls may
act rapidly after a legislative change occurs, but this response is
rarely sustained. This may explain the short-term and delayed
association observed in Concepción and Valparaíso-Viña del
Mar, respectively. Second, alcohol consumption studies carried
out in Chile39 have suggested that high-risk municipalities are
mostly located in Concepción. This pattern is thus likely asso-
ciated with high consumption of home-made or illegal alcohol,
as well as poor response of health services to provide treat-
ment for diseases related to alcohol consumption. While Chile
is a centralised state, its public resources are not evenly dis-
tributed across cities. This has been particularly noticeable for
road safety policies.40 A combination of high alcohol
consumption with a weak state intervention may explain
what we observed in Concepción. Last, while Uber entered
in these cities with considerable publicity, and currently there
are more Uber drivers than taxi drivers in these cities, its
exponential rise in popularity may have been interrupted on
different occasions since private taxi representatives and dri-
vers explicitly boycotted its functioning on at least five occa-
sions in 2016 and 2017.41 This may have discouraged
potential Uber drivers from joining the company or restricted
their journeys, and thus ridesharing supply may not have kept
pace with demand from potential users who may have con-
sumed alcohol. Even further, 10% of Uber drivers are women,
and recent reports suggest that they are less likely to drive at
night since they can be subject to attacks by other taxi drivers,
and when they do, they generally avoid transporting indivi-
duals under the influence of alcohol.41
Table 4 Associations of three interventions on alcohol-related motor vehicle crash rates per 10 000 000 population, Valparaíso-Viña del Mar,
1 January 2010—31 December 2017 (ARMA (1,0)) for residuals.
Naïve model Uber-oriented model Full model
β 95% CI P-value β 95% CI P-value β 95% CI P-value
Time −0.003 −0.007 to 0.001 0.129 0.003 −0.004 to 0.010 0.466 0.003 −0.004 to 0.010 0.466
Zero tolerance law −0.370 −0.955 to 0.215 0.214 −0.394 −1.034 to 0.246 0.227 −0.394 −1.034 to 0.246 0.227
Zero tolerance law change in trend −0.010 −0.019 to −0.001 0.026 −0.010 −0.019 to −0.001 0.026
Emilia law 0.173 −0.378 to 0.724 0.537 0.421 −0.184 to 1.026 0.172 0.316 −0.396 to 1.028 0.384
Emilia law change in trend 0.006 −0.003 to 0.016 0.204 0.009 −0.005 to 0.023 0.198
Uber 0.488 −0.028 to 1.003 0.064 0.351 −0.416 to 1.117 0.369 0.322 −0.452 to 1.095 0.414
Uber change in trend −0.004 −0.020 to 0.011 0.583
Constant 2.440 2.110 to 2.777 <0.001 2.111 1.642 to 2.582 <0.001 2.112 1.642 to 2.582 <0.001
Autoregressive, Akaike information criterion and Ljung-Box tests values for each model are available in online supplementary Appendix F.
Figure 1 Weekly time-series plots for the proportion of all alcohol-related crash fatalities and injuries in Santiago (1 January 2010 to 30 December 2017). The
predicted values for Santiago are obtained from an interrupted time-series model (SARIMA (2,0,0) (1,0,0)8) from Equation 3 (full model).




















Our findings may explain the mixed results obtained in
a previous time-series study using ARIMA modelling.15 Indeed,
associations differ when different geographic scales are used. In
our study, the largest urban conglomerate, Santiago, clearly
benefited from the two reforms and Uber had a null impact. By
contrast, in Valparaíso-Viña del Mar and Concepción, urban
conglomerates with 1 000 000 population, we did not observe
sustained changes from the two state interventions or with the
Figure 2 Weekly time-series plots for the proportion of all alcohol-related crash fatalities and injuries in Santiago (1 January 2010 to
30 December 2017). The predicted values for Santiago are obtained from an interrupted time-series model (SARIMA (2,0,0) (1,0,0)8) from Equation 2
(Uber-oriented model).
Figure 3 Weekly time-series plots for the proportion of all alcohol-related crash fatalities and injuries in Concepción (1 January 2010 to
30 December 2017). The predicted values for Concepción are obtained from an interrupted time-series model (ARMA (2,0)) from Equation 3 (full model).




















introduction of ridesharing. It is possible that smaller cities may
require a higher proportion of police enforcement practices and
more aggressive expansion and marketing of ridesharing services
than larger cities. However, analyses considering the volume of
police enforcement and the number of ridesharing trips are
required to identify how these two mechanisms operate. In
terms of properly measuring the impact of ridesharing, it is
important to note that operationalisations which capture expo-
nential growth should also be advanced since this specific pattern
can have other effects on alcohol-related crashes but also in the
total number of crashes.
There were several limitations to our approach. First,
police assessment of alcohol involvement and classification
of injuries and fatalities may not be consistent over time or
across cities, and this measurement error might bias results.
However, while differences between alcohol-related crashes
between Santiago and Concepción could be an expression of
measurement error, it is noteworthy that binge drinking for
individuals aged 17–35 increased from 3.7% in 2012 to 9.5%
in 2016 in Concepción, compared to 6.1% to 7.4% in
Santiago; these different patterns might contribute to differ-
ential effects across cities.42 Second, although we selected
cities in which Uber operations occurred at different times,
we did not have continuous measures of rideshare utilisation
(eg, counts of Uber journeys), the supply of this service by
the gender of drivers, nor whether regular taxi services varied
over time after the introduction of Uber. These missing ele-
ments would help to better understand the relation between
ridesharing and alcohol-related crashes. Third, we cannot
rule out the potential for unmeasured time-varying confound-
ing, and particularly the potential for other coincident
externalities such as an increase in gas prices which reduce
overall mobility to impact rates of alcohol-related crash fatal-
ities and injuries.
This study highlights that state interventions in centralised
countries may reduce alcohol-involved crashes, and thus should
become or remain a priority. These associations, nevertheless, are
likely to differ across urban conglomerates and over time. Future
studies should thus seek to identify the key aspects of these differ-
ential relationships and the characteristics of urban conglomerates
where the public health impacts of state interventions are the
weakest. This study also adds a quote of healthy skepticism to
public health solutions based on technological determinism. In
other words, technological changes can indeed be excellent plat-
forms to protect populations but not necessarily regarded as suffi-
cient solutions to tackle public health challenges. Nevertheless,
more rigorous empirical studies should be advanced to provide
clearer explanations on whether road safety and public health
benefits can indeed emerge from this novel technology.
Figure 4 Weekly time-series plots for theproportionof all alcohol-relatedcrash fatalities and injuries inValparaíso-ViñadelMar (1 January2010 to30December2017).
The predicted values for Valparaíso-Viña del Mar are obtained from an interrupted time-series model (ARMA (1,0)) from Equation 2 (Uber equation model).
What is already known on this subject?
► It is estimated thatmore than 270 000 people die yearly in alcohol-
related crashes globally. To tackle this burden, government
interventions, such as laws which restrict blood alcohol
concentration levels while driving, have been implemented.
► Ridesharing technologies, such as Uber, have also been
regarded as important alternatives to decrease alcohol-
related crashes.
► Effects of network ridesharing on alcohol-related traffic
crashes have been studied in the United States and South
Africa. Results are mixed, with some studies suggesting
reductions in alcohol-related crashes after Uber was
introduced, but other studies not observing any change.
► No prior study has considered how ridesharing interacts with
government measures that directly tackle alcohol-impaired driving.
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What does this study add?
► This study is the first to investigate the effect of Uber on
alcohol traffic mortality and morbidity in a setting in which
two government interventions were purposely introduced to
decrease alcohol-impaired driving and its consequences.
► We found evidence that regardless of the city in which Uber
is introduced no changes in the alcohol-related injury and
traffic fatality rates were observed, but rather both initiatives
were more likely to decrease these outcomes.
► More rigorous empirical studies should be advanced to
provide clearer explanations on whether public health
benefits can indeed emerge from ridesharing technologies.
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